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Symposium
Introduction: The Emerging Power of
Context over Conventional Wisdom in
Scholarship on Law and Terrorism
Peter Margulies* and Laura Corbin**
Conventional wisdom has produced two schools of thought on
legal responses to September 11. On the one hand, some scholars
have argued that the law prior to September 11 provided all the
flexibility that the government ever needed, and that measures
such as the Patriot Act that increased government power were
dangerous to the delicate balance between liberty and security.
1
Other scholars have been either apologists for or architects of the
Bush administration's policies, arguing that the legal constraints
in place before the attacks and pressed by administration critics
today are a form of "lawfare" exploited by America's enemies.
2
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. I thank Dean
David Logan for his generous support of this symposium.
** J.D. 2008, Roger Williams University School of Law.
1. See generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY
AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (New Press 2007). The description of
this school of thought is, to be sure, a broad-brush portrayal that masks some
concessions to the post-September 11 environment. See id. (acknowledging
that intervention in Afghanistan was appropriate).
2. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF
THE WAR ON TERROR 106-08 (Atlantic Monthly Press 2006) (arguing that
restrictions on wiretapping and data collection endanger national security).
Some prominent commentators identified with this view nevertheless have
voiced concern about the unilateralism of the Bush administration's moves
and the failure of some legal opinions to address adverse authority. Compare
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
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Neither view does justice to the complexities of the post-9/11
world.
The participants in this symposium seek to avoid such stark
stances. 3 Their contributions, presented on November 9, 2007 at
the Roger Williams University School of Law symposium on
"Legal Dilemmas in a Dangerous World: Law, Terrorism and
National Security," cover a wide range of issues, including the
habeas corpus rights of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, the state
secrets privilege, defense lawyering before the military
commissions, and opportunities for Muslim-Americans to both
comply with laws regulating the financing of terrorist groups and
fulfill their faith-bound obligation of charitable giving. Running
through each essay is a conviction that the rule of law is flexible
enough to protect national security without endangering core
freedoms.
In The Corruption of Civilization, Professor Timothy Kuhner
denies that security and liberty are competing sides in a zero-sum
game.4 Instead, Kuhner argues, our security is often best served
by adhering to our political values, viewing war as a last resort,
and seeking solutions through the application of "soft power,"
including political, social, and cultural influence. 5 According to
Kuhner, preemptive war in Iraq, indefinite detention of terror
suspects, and torture have simultaneously undermined both our
hard won national tradition of human dignity and our end-game:
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 58 (W.W. Norton and Company 2007) (describing
concept of "lawfare" against American interests), with id. at 71 (noting
displeasure of senior Bush administration official when author, former head
of Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, indicated legal doubts about
counterterrorism initiative); cf. Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law:
National Security Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of
Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1097314 (discussing influence of lawfare paradigm within Bush
administration legal circles).
3. This striving for balance has also marked the best discussions of
previous national security challenges. See Robert H. Jackson, Wartime
Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 116 (1951) (contrasting
"exaggerated claims of security" with opposing flaw of "contemptuously
ignoring the reasonable anxieties of wartime").
4. See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Corruption of Civilization, 13 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 349, 371 & n.71 (2008).
5. Id. at 365 & n.56. Kuhner discusses the merits of JOSEPH S. NYE,
SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS (Public Affairs 2004).
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national security. 6 "War" fighters on both sides, Kuhner asserts,
are violating international law as well as "norms of due process
and civilized treatment. '7 After laying the legal and historical
foundations for his premise that the identity of the United States
rests on human rights, Kuhner reinforces the idea that protecting
human rights, and therefore the strength of our appeal to the rest
of the world, is the path to both freedom and security.8 His
challenge to us "as citizens in a democracy [is] to produce
something better than a war on terrorism."9
Professor Nina Crimm argues in her essay, Muslim-
Americans' Charitable Giving Dilemma: What About a Terror-free
Donor Advised Fund?, that terrorist financing restrictions can be
counterproductive when they ignore the importance of core
Islamic beliefs. 10 Crimm notes that millions of Muslim-Americans
face a dilemma in the aftermath of September 11 when they wish
to uphold one of the pillars of their Islamic faith: the obligation of
zakat or charity." As Crimm explains, zakat is often focused on
assisting the "world's neediest Muslims."12 After September 11,
however, donating to Muslim charities became a minefield. 13
Through an analysis of the fallout after passage of the USA
Patriot Act and other laws, Crimm demonstrates that Muslim-
Americans fear investigation or prosecution for making a
6. Id. at 363 & n.47; id. at 362.
7. Id. at 351 & n.7.
8. Id. at 372 (see text before n.72). For more of Professor Kuhner's
thoughts about human rights, see Timothy K. Kuhner, Human Rights
Treaties in U.S. Law: The Status Quo, Its Underlying Bases, and Pathways
for Change, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 419 (2003). See also Harold Hongju
Koh, Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, 40 CORNELL INT'L. L.J.
635 (2007) (describing how the U.S. war on terror has undermined U.S.
human rights policy and therefore its soft power).
9. Id. (see text after n.73).
10. See Nina J. Crimm, Muslim Americans' Charitable Giving Dilemma:
What About a Terror-Free Donor Advised Fund?, 13 ROGER WILLIAMs U. L.
REV. 375, 392 (2008).
11. Id. at 377 (see text before n.l). Cf. Peter Margulies, Laws of
Unintended Consequences: Terrorist Financing Restrictions and Transitions
to Democracy, 20 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 65 (2007) (discussing virtues and vices of
terrorist financing statutes).
12. Crimm, supra note 10, at 378 & n.17.
13. For more of Crimm's views on this topic, see Nina J. Crimm, High
Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of Terrorism and Its
Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global
Philanthropy (High Alert), 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341 (2004).
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charitable contribution to impoverished Muslims overseas.14
To remedy this problem, Crimm proposes creation of a "terror-
free Donor Advised Fund."15 Such a fund, she suggests, would
ensure that charitable contributions from Muslims in the U.S. are
not supporting terrorism, but instead are helping to relieve
poverty and suffering in parts of the world where those
deprivations might "exacerbate terrorism." 16 Striking a balance
on the financial front between Americans' religious identity and
national security enhances both.
In Habeas Corpus, Alternative Remedies, and the Myth of
Swain v. Pressley, 17 Professor Stephen Vladeck moves from policy
to legal doctrine regarding terror detainees.1 8 Recent doctrinal
clashes 19 have centered on the availability to detainees of the writ
of habeas corpus. The struggle over habeas came to a head with
Congress' passage of the Military Commissions Act, which
purports to withhold access to the writ.2 ° In earlier cases, the
Supreme Court has typically cited to its decision in Swain v.
Pressley for the proposition that when Congress limits the writ
through some means short of outright suspension, it must provide
an adequate substitute. 2 1  Vladeck argues that the Supreme
Court's dutiful citation of Pressley in cases involving
congressional efforts to limit access to habeas corpus masks a
14. Crimm, supra note 10, at 385-392 & nn.60-95; See Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title I, § 106, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
15. Crimm, supra note 10, at 395 (see text between nn.108-09).
16. Id. at 385 & n.57; cf. Garry W. Jenkins, Soft Power, Strategic Security
and International Philanthropy, 85 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2007) (arguing that
international philanthropy is an ally not an enemy in the war on terror).
17. 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
18. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Habeas Corpus, Alternative Remedies, and
the Myth of Swain v. Pressley, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 411. For more
on Vladeck's inquiry into the availability of habeas corpus in the context of
the war on terror, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Enemy Aliens, Enemy Property,
and Access to the Courts, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 963 (2007).
19. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted,
127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
485-88 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Gherebi v. Bush,
352 F.3d 1278, 1285-99 (9th Cir. 2003).
20. 10 U.S.C.A. § 950j(b) (West Supp. 2007). In Boumediene v. Bush, 128
S. Ct. 2229 (2008), the Court struck down these restrictions on access to
habeas corpus.
21. See Vladeck, supra note 18, at 412 & n.8.
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significant gap in habeas jurisprudence: the Court has repeatedly
declined to define what procedures are adequate. 22 According to
Vladeck, Congress rushed into this vacuum with the Military
Commissions Act.23 To ensure that Congress does not "suffocate
the writ, ''24 Vladeck concludes that the Court should relinquish
the "myth" of Pressley and offer clear guidance. 25
Presenting doctrinal guidance on another important issue,
Professor Robert Chesney squarely addresses the perceived
conflict between our esteem for the rights of the individual and
democratic accountability on the one hand and national security
on the other in Legislative Reform of the State Secrets Privilege.26
The administration has cited the state secrets privilege both as a
shield, to ensure that litigation will not result in the disclosure of
sensitive information, and as a sword, to persuade courts to
dismiss litigation (for example, lawsuits based on the
government's Terrorist Surveillance Program).27  Chesney
recognizes that all too often government officials have exploited
the state secrets privilege to shield the government from
revelations of its own incompetence. 28  However, Chesney also
acknowledges that wholesale disclosure of sensitive information
could do real damage to national security interests. 29
In search of the right balance, Chesney focuses on the newly
introduced State Secrets Protection Act.30 He points out the Act's
22. Id. at 426-27.
23. Id. at 435-37 & nn.110-15.
24. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350 (1973).
25. Vladeck, supra note 18, at 441-42 & n.130.
26. Robert M. Chesney, Legislative Reform of the State Secrets Privilege,
13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 442 (2008). For further discussion of the state
secrets privilege, see Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of
National Security Litigation, 75 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007). The U.S.
Supreme Court recognized the state secrets privilege in United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
27. See e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev'd,
493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007); Hepting v. AT&T, 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D.
Cal. 2006).
28. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (discussing privilege); cf. STEPHEN
DYcUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAw 1043 (Aspen Publisher 4th ed. 2006)
(noting that information for which government claimed privilege in Reynolds
concerned not advanced technology but mere pilot error).
29. Chesney, supra note 26, at 457-58.
30. See S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://frwebgate.access
.gpo.gov/cgibinlgetdoc.cgi?dbname=1 10_cong.bills&docid=f:s2533is.txt.pdf.
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benefits for plaintiffs: a mandate that the court examine evidence
claimed as privileged, its provisions for substitute evidence when
the privilege does attach, judicially appointed experts to advise
the court, and the introduction of guardians ad litem to represent
the non-government party in what are currently ex parte
hearings. 31 He also suggests that the Act goes too far at times,
potentially compromising national security by allowing attorneys
for the non-government party to learn about evidence that is later
found to be privileged.32 Chesney has submitted his commentary
as testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee which held a
hearing on the legislation in February.33
Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky takes on conventional wisdom
about the role of lawyers in terrorism cases in her thoughtful
contribution, Zealous Lawyering Succeeds Against All Odds:
Major Mori and the Legal Team for David Hicks at Guantanamo
Bay.34 After President Bush issued his order establishing the
military commissions, some progressives criticized the order
(which the Supreme Court in Hamdan35 ruled exceeded the
president's authority) by raising doubts about the independence of
military lawyers who would defend the detainees. 36 Indeed,
supporters of the military commissions appeared to implicitly
accept this premise, believing that military lawyers would be
docile advocates at best. Yaroshefsky's essay counters this
assumption with a compelling narrative about how the Hicks team
succeeded by challenging the legitimacy of the commissions both
in the tribunal itself and in the court of public opinion.37 The
Hicks team concentrated their efforts on Hicks' home country,
Australia, which also happens to be an ally of the United States.
The result was a negotiated plea for Hicks that secured his release
31. Chesney supra note 26, at 466.
32. Id. at 457-58.
33. STATE SECRETS PROTECTION ACT, S. Rep No. 110-938 (2008).
34. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Zealous Lawyering Succeeds Against All
Odds: Major Mori and the Legal Team for David Hicks at Guantanamo Bay,
13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 468.
35. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
36. See Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice
Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 653, 656-57 (2002).
37. Yaroshefsky, supra note 34, at 479.
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from Guantanamo. 38  Yaroshefsky poignantly portrays the
lawyers' anxiety that the plea would legitimize the Bush
administration's overreaching. 39  Nevertheless, she argues
convincingly that the plea not only helped Hicks but also
underscored the ongoing problems with the military
commissions. 40 Ironically, the committed and creative advocacy of
the Hicks team furnished rare common ground for the Bush
administration and its critics, each of whom had underestimated
the institutional culture and pride of military lawyers.
As the authors in this Symposium demonstrate, conventional
wisdom only goes so far in meeting the challenges of the post-
September 11 legal environment. In place of the old ideologically
entrenched positions, new approaches are necessary. The authors
in this Symposium make substantial contributions to that crucial
debate.
38. Yaroshefsky, supra note 34, at 490-92 & nn.106-17.
39. Id. at 478 & nn.49-50. For a further perspective on the ethics of
lawyers representing clients in an arguably unfair system, see Mary Cheh,
Should Lawyers Participate in Rigged Systems? The Case of the Military
Commissions, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 375 (2005).
40. Yaroshefsky, supra note 34, at 490-92 & nn.108-114.
